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ABSTRACT
Complacency refers to a type of automation use expressed as insufficient
monitoring and verification of automated functions. Previous studies have attempted to
identify the age-related factors that influence complacency during interaction with
automation. However, little is known about the role of age-related differences in working
memory capacity and its connection to complacent behaviors. The current study
examined whether working memory demand of an automated task and age-related
differences in cognitive ability influence complacency. Working memory demand was
manipulated in the task with two degrees of automation (i.e., information and decision).
A younger and older age group was included to observe the effects of differences in
working memory capacity on performance in a targeting task using an automated aid. The
results of the study show that younger and older adults did not significantly differ in
complacent behavior for information or decision automation. Also, individual differences
in working memory capacity did not predict complacency in the automated task.
However, these findings do not disprove the role of working memory in automationinduced complacency. Both age groups were more complacent with automation that had
less working memory demand. Our findings suggest systems that utilize both higher and
lower degrees of automation could limit overdependence. These results provide
implications for the design of automated interfaces.
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INTRODUCTION
People depend on a wide variety of automated technologies to support accurate
and effective decision-making; for example, these technologies are used in domains such
as aviation, healthcare, and transportation. When automation is highly reliable, users will
tend to increasingly depend on the system. This high level of dependence, or automationinduced complacency, can lead the user to make incorrect assumptions that automation is
more reliable than it is (Billings, Lauber, Funkhouser, Lyman, & Huff, 1976). One
consequence is that users are less likely to notice when the automation does fail. Thus,
complacency is a state of dependence where a user fails to notice imperfect automation.
When the user poorly monitors the system and does not detect a fault, performance
consequences can result (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Users may have a delayed
reaction to the presence of an automation failure or might miss the failure altogether.
There are a limited number of known system and human-related factors that are
connected to complacency (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Complacency effects are
most likely to emerge when the automated system is designed in a particular way.
System-related factors include automation reliability and task complexity (Parasuraman,
Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Individuals have difficulty
detecting automation failures when the system is highly reliable and the task is more
demanding (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007). In addition to system-related factors, there are
individual differences that can induce greater dependence on the automation. The humanrelated factors that are known to impact complacent behavior include system experience
(Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996), trust in automation (Muir & Moray, 1996), and
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complacency potential (Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993b). Positive attitudes and
experiences from automation use limit an individual’s ability to detect automation
failures (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007). Aside from individual differences, there has been a lack
of research examining group differences in automation-induced complacency.
One main source of group differences in automation complacency is age, such
that older adults are more complacent with automation than younger adults (Ho,
Wheatley, & Scialfa, 2005). Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa (2005) examined the effects of
age on complacency using a decision aid in a medication management task. The
researchers found that older adults depended on imperfect automation more than younger
adults, yet were unable to determine the reason for this age disparity. Older adults might
be more prone to complacent behavior because they have greater trust in automation and
experience greater mental workload compared to younger adults (Ho, Wheatley, &
Scialfa, 2005). However, most research on age differences in automation use requires
multi-tasking to operate complex automation. Since older adults have age-related
decrements in cognition, they have fewer resources to perform complex mental tasks
(Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). Therefore, the high cognitive demands necessary to detect
system failures over a long duration may influence older adults to over-depend on
automation.
A potential explanation suggested for the divide between age groups’
complacency behavior has been age-related reductions in working memory (Ho, Kiff,
Plocher, & Haigh, 2005). Working memory is a cognitive system that provides temporary
storage and manipulation of information that is used in many complex tasks (Baddeley,
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1992). Due to age-related changes in cognition, working memory capacity significantly
declines after the age of 60 (Morris, Gick, & Craik, 1988). Since complacent behavior
requires fewer cognitive resources, older adults might be more susceptible to depend on
automation when it has greater working memory demand.
Researchers have recently explored the role of working memory on automation
use and found that individual differences in working memory capacity predicted
performance in an automated UAV task (de Visser, Shaw, Mohamed-Ameen &
Parasuraman, 2010). Individuals with greater working memory capacity had higher
performance. High working memory capacity has also been shown to minimize the
negative effects associated with increasingly supportive, but faulty automation (Rovira,
Pak, & McLaughlin, accepted with revisions). Even though these studies were limited to
younger adults, the results indicate that age decrements in working memory capacity
should decrease older adults’ performance in automated tasks.
There are two main aspects of working memory that contribute to older adults’
complacent behavior with automated technologies (Ho, Kiff, Plocher, & Haigh, 2005).
The first is that older adults form inaccurate decision making when using automation and
struggle to determine the correct choice. When older adults have an insufficient
understanding of the automated aid, they might believe the aid is reliable and not verify
its recommendation. If older adults are not able to adequately compare their own decision
to the automation’s advice, they should fail to notice the presence of system failures. The
second is that due to their reduced working memory capacity, older adults are unable to
judge the accuracy of automation (Ho, Kiff, Plocher, & Haigh, 2005; Olson, Fisk, &
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Rogers, 2009). Working memory is needed to activate and maintain useful information
(e.g., relevant task goals) for later use. Diminished working memory may prevent users
from keeping track of previous automation failures. When older adults need to retain
several task goals at once, their working memory becomes limited by distractions from
multitasking (Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989). If older adults’ reduced working
memory makes it harder to detect or remember automation failures, they will have a
distorted view of the system.
We assume older adults’ relative complacency with automation is due to a
mismatch between the working memory demands of the task and working memory
capacity of the person (Ho, Kiff, Plocher, & Haigh, 2005). If working memory capacity
plays such a central role in automation complacency, we should observe the opposite
relationship as well: reduced complacency in older adults when the automation has been
designed to demand relatively fewer working memory resources. The design of Ho,
Wheatley, & Scialfa’s (2005) study precludes this determination because the working
memory demand of the tasks was not manipulated to vary during the experiment. Thus, it
is unclear whether the high working memory demand of those tasks contributed to the
difference in complacency between younger and older adults.
Current Study
The goal of the experiment was to examine the role of age-related differences in
working memory on automation-induced complacency. If complacency is related to
working memory, then altering the working memory demands of the task should affect
complacency. Fortunately, the working memory demands of automation are related to the
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quantity of information presented to the user through the amount of support provided by
automation (i.e., degrees of automation (DOA)) (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens,
2000; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). Therefore, we can change the working memory
demands of the task by altering the DOA presented to the user.
Higher DOAs are associated with greater performance in addition to diminished
cognitive demand (Wickens, Li, Santamaria, Sebok, & Sarter, 2010). Since the
automation is taking on more of the task for the user, cognitive demand is reduced under
a higher DOA. This leaves the user with more cognitive resources at higher DOAs. Thus,
working memory demands should lessen and detection of automation failures (i.e.,
verification behaviors) should increase as older adults move from a lower DOA towards a
higher DOA.
We expected to find greater age-related differences in complacency as working
memory demands increased. Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa (2005) only used a high DOA
(with concomitantly high working memory demands) to examine differences in
complacency between younger and older adults. Therefore, we used two DOAs that
should vary in working memory demand in order to investigate the effects of lower (i.e.,
information automation) and higher (i.e., decision automation) DOAs on complacency.
We tested that information automation had greater working memory demand than
decision automation by examining the relationship between working memory capacity
and task accuracy. We expected that younger adults would experience less working
memory demand than older adults and their higher working memory capacity would be
less predictive of task accuracy. Since older adults should have lower working memory
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capacity, and lower DOAs have shown greater working memory demand, we
hypothesized that working memory capacity of older adults would be more predictive of
task accuracy for information automation than decision automation.
This study utilized a low-fidelity targeting simulation to analyze the accuracy and
speed of user selections. Since higher DOAs have been linked with reduced cognitive
demand (Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2014), we hypothesized that participants
would perform better under decision automation than information automation. Older
adults were predicted to have lower working memory capacity than younger adults
because of changes in fluid intelligence. Based on these age-related changes in cognitive
abilities, we predicted a main effect of age group on task accuracy and completion time,
where younger adults would outperform older adults.
We can infer the extent to which participants are complacent by analyzing their
pattern of performance when the automation succeeds (i.e., reliable automation) and fails
(i.e., unreliable automation). Low task accuracy for unreliable automation and high task
accuracy for reliable automation indicates higher complacency because the user is relying
heavily on the system without monitoring for failures. Therefore, we examined task
accuracy for reliable and unreliable automation trials across two DOAs and age groups.
We hypothesized that information automation would result in a greater difference in
complacency between the age groups than at decision automation. We anticipated this
result because the high working memory demand of information automation should limit
only older adults’ performance. Thus, lower working memory capacity should affect
older adults’ ability to verify information provided by the automated system.

6

METHODS
Participants
Forty-six undergraduate students were recruited through the Clemson University
Sona Systems Participant Pool website and were given course credit for their
participation. We recruited 44 older adults (ages 65-75) from the local area and
compensated them $25 for their time. Both age groups were tested separately; however,
up to 6 participants of the same age group were tested at one time. All participants
worked independently at individual workstations.
Tasks
Targeting Task
The tasks for this study were adapted from prior research that used an automated
system in the context of a low-fidelity unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) simulation
(Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007). The primary task for this study was to quickly
find the closest combination of friendly (green) and enemy (red) units in terms of
distance apart on the grid (Figure 1). The headquarters (orange) unit was used to
determine the best answer when more than one friendly and enemy unit pairing had the
shortest distance. Battalion (yellow) units were included in the grid as distractor targets.
The grid always displayed 3 friendly units, 3 enemy units, 3 battalion units, and 1
headquarters unit. Automation was presented in the form of a table, which showed
distances and unit combinations needed by participants to complete the primary task.
Communications Task
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The secondary task consisted of checking for a specific call sign and clicking a
corresponding button when it appeared on screen (Figure 1). The call sign was comprised
of a single word and number combination (e.g., Hunter-6). The program randomly
switched to a different call sign (14 total) every 5 seconds as the participant completed
the primary task.

Figure 1. Screenshot of targeting and communications tasks. Features communications
panel (top-left), targeting input panel (middle-left), automation table (bottom-left), and
grid (right).
Design
The experiment was a 2 (age group: young, old) x 2 (DOA: information, decision)
x 2 (trial reliability: unreliable, reliable) mixed-subjects design. Age group was a
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between-subjects independent variable. DOA and trial reliability were within-subjects
independent variables.
Participants completed eight blocks of 160 total trials (20 trials per block), where
each block displayed either information or decision automation (Appendix A). A
randomized block design was utilized within each age group. Thus, participants were first
presented with either four information automation blocks or four decision automation
blocks before continuing to the other DOA. The assignment of presentation order was
randomized for every participant prior to recruitment.
The working memory demand of the targeting task was manipulated by using two
DOAs (i.e., information and decision) in the automation table. Information automation
displayed all possible friendly and enemy unit combinations in the grid (9 total) and
sorted the order of enemy units (e.g., E1-E3) (Appendix A). This DOA placed greater
demand on working memory to locate the best answer because of the increased amount of
information shown and the lack of useful organization within the automation table.
Decision automation presented the top three friendly and enemy unit combinations
(Appendix A). This DOA sorted the information based on importance, so that the shortest
distance for a unit combination was shown at the top. Decision automation placed less
demand on working memory to locate the best answer because of the reduced amount of
information presented and the improved organization within the automation table.
The overall automation reliability was set at 80% because operators will depend
upon imperfect automation above an approximate level of performance (70%) (Wickens
& Dixon, 2007). In each block of 20 trials, 16 trials were reliable and the remaining 4
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trials were unreliable. An unreliable trial contained inaccurate distance values between
friendly and enemy units within the automation table (Appendix A). The first automation
failure did not occur until the 10th trial, so that users could rebuild trust after each block.
Subsequent automation failures were distributed randomly throughout the remaining
trials.
The dependent variables were targeting accuracy, targeting time, complacency
potential, and working memory capacity. Targeting accuracy was measured by the mean
rate of optimal responses for each automation block. An optimal response is the correct
identification of the closest pair of friendly and enemy units in the targeting task.
Targeting time was measured by the average duration (in seconds) it took participants to
complete each trial. Complacency potential was comprised of subjective ratings on the
Complacency Potential Rating Scale (CPRS). Working memory capacity measured the
sum of perfectly recalled sets of letters on the Automated Operation Span (AOSPAN)
task.
Materials
Equipment
The tasks were programmed in Xojo for Windows and presented (maximized with
no visible user interface) on a 19-inch LCD monitor set at a resolution of 1024 x 1280.
Participants sat approximately 18 inches away from the computer screen and interacted
primarily with a mouse and a keyboard. Participants were told to adjust equipment as
necessary. Six-foot tall cubicle dividers separated each computer station.
Surveys & Abilities
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Demographic and health information were collected from each participant. The
following cognitive abilities were assessed: perceptual speed (Digit-Symbol Substitution;
Wechsler, 1997), vocabulary (Shipley Vocabulary; Shipley, 1986), and working memory
(Automated Operation Span (AOSPAN); Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).
Instructions for the AOSPAN can be found in Appendix B. These measures were chosen
because they are reliable indicators of their respective abilities (e.g., Czaja et al., 2006).
In the AOSPAN, participants were instructed to complete simple math problems
while remembering the order of individual letters that were presented after solving each
problem. Younger adults needed to correctly answer at least 85% of the math problems
and recall as many letters as possible. Consistent with other aging literature (Zeintl &
Kliegel, 2007), older adults needed to correctly answer at least 80% of the math
problems. The AOSPAN score consisted of the sum of all perfectly recalled letter sets,
where higher scores indicated greater working memory capacity. AOSPAN scores under
two standard deviations away from the mean were established as additional exclusion
criteria because a score that low indicates that participants were not performing both
tasks.
A blocked design for the UAV simulation allowed us to administer a historybased trust measure using a survey adapted from Lee and Moray (1992) (Appendix C)
and the NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988) at the end of each block of trials.
Measures of dispositional trust (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008) using a survey developed by Jian,
Bisantz, and Drury (2000) (Appendix D) and automation complacency potential using the
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CPRS (Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman, 1993a) (Appendix E) were used to assess age
differences.
Procedure
Participants were seated at individual computers and provided with informed
consent. After giving verbal consent, participants were instructed to complete the
AOSPAN task. The participants then filled out the demographics form and finished the
remaining cognitive ability measures (i.e., Digit Symbol Substitution and Shipley
Vocabulary). The experimenter told participants to open and observe the instructions
screen for the UAV simulation. Participants were told the following: “In this experiment,
you will have two tasks. Please keep in mind that you will perform both tasks
simultaneously. The first task will be to monitor the communications panel for the call
sign Hunter-6. When you see Hunter-6, you should click the answer button. The second
task will be to target enemy units with the closest friendly unit as quickly as you can. You
will do this by first selecting a friendly unit from the list of buttons in the targeting input
and then select an enemy target from the list of buttons and click OK. The computer aid
will sometimes help you with this task by showing you the distances between friendly
and enemy units. Sometimes, two sets of targets will have the same distance. In this case,
you will pick the friendly unit with the shortest distance to the headquarters. Sometimes
the computer aid will give you lots of information, other times it will give you much less
information. The computer aid can be very reliable but it is not perfect all the time.” After
these instructions, the experimenter had participants attempt 8 practice trials (all reliable
automation with no feedback). The first half of the practice trials featured information
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automation and the latter half featured decision automation. After the practice trials, the
experimenter answered any questions before the participants started the actual task.
Participants then proceeded through each block of real trials. As participants
completed the tasks, the units inside the grid (i.e., friendly, enemy, battalion, and
headquarters) and the information within automation table (i.e., distance values and unit
pairings) changed after each trial. During the experiment, a screen appeared to indicate
when participants lingered too long on a particular trial. If participants did not input an
answer within the set time limit, the program would automatically continue to the next
trial. Younger adults had 10 seconds to complete each trial, while older adults had 20
seconds. Older adults had more time for the task because of normative age-related
differences in psychomotor speed (Salthouse, 1985). Time limits were based on an
analysis of “timed out” trials (i.e., the participant did not answer quickly enough) from
pilot testing the task with each age group. Between each block of trials, participants filled
out the NASA-TLX survey and a brief history-based trust measure. When participants
completed the automation program, the computer presented them with the dispositional
trust and CPRS surveys. At the conclusion of the experiment, the experimenter debriefed
participants and provided them compensation for their time.
RESULTS
Eight participants that met the exclusion criteria on the AOSPAN measure were
eliminated. From that total, 5 participants (3 younger and 2 older adults) were removed
because they performed below a set value (i.e. less than 80% for older adults and 85% for
younger adults) on the math portion of the task. Two younger adults were eliminated due
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to obtaining a low working memory capacity score (i.e., scores under 2 standard
deviations away from the mean). Only 1 younger adult was removed because of data loss
from a computer shutting down during testing. The remaining 40 younger adults (M =
18.30, SD = 0.79) and 42 older adults (M = 70.00, SD = 3.19) were used in the analysis of
all dependent variables. Participant demographics can be found in Table 1.
Table 1
Participant Demographic Frequencies by Age Group
Category
Younger Adults
Gender
Female
23
Male
17
Race/Ethnicity
Asian
2
Black/African-American
2
White
33
Hispanic/Latino
2
Other
1
Health
Fair
0
Good
7
Very Good
26
Excellent
7
Highest Education
High school graduate/GED
33
Vocational training
0
Some college/Associate's degree
7
College graduate
0
Master's degree (or other post-grad)
0
Doctoral degree (PhD, MD, EdD, etc.)
0

Older Adults
24
18
1
0
41
0
0
4
10
21
7
0
1
9
11
18
3

Before starting the analyses, trials that “timed out” (i.e., the participant did not
answer quickly enough) were removed. The remaining results are structured to discuss
each hypothesis and the accompanying analyses. We examined age-related differences in
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the AOSPAN task, the amount of working memory demand for each automated aid,
differences in complacency potential between age groups, performance (completion time
and accuracy) in the targeting task, and the role of working memory capacity in
complacency. For the following analyses, significance is defined as an alpha level of .05.
Cognitive Abilities
Working memory capacity was examined as part of a larger set of measures to
check for age-related differences in cognitive abilities (see Table 2). Working memory
capacity on the AOSPAN task was calculated by summing the length of each correctly
recalled letter set (between 3 and 7 letters long). For example, if the individual correctly
remembered three 5 letter strings, their total score would be 15. The possible scores
ranged from 0 to 75. There was a significant effect for age, t(80) = 4.61, p < .001, ηp2 =
.21, with younger adults (M = 38.05, SD = 13.99) scoring higher for working memory
capacity than older adults (M = 23.29, SD = 14.94).
Consistent with prior aging research (Wechsler, 1981; Shipley, 1986) older adults
scored significantly higher than younger adults on the Shipley Vocabulary test and older
adults scored significantly higher than younger adults on the Digit-Symbol Substitution
task (both p < .001) (Table 2). Only the Digit-Symbol Substitution task violated of
homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances. After
we used the Welch-Satterthwaite method to make adjustments for this cognitive ability
test, we still observed significant differences between age groups (p < .001). The
differences on these cognitive ability measures confirm the expected age-related changes
in cognition between the groups.
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Table 2
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Scores on Cognitive Ability Measures
Younger Adults
Older Adults
SD
M
SD
Measure
M
a
Automated Operation Span
38.05
13.99
23.29
14.94
Digit Symbol Substitutionb
1090.81
113.25
1773.19
422.10
Shipley Vocabularyc
29.38
3.03
36.02
2.31
a
Note. Total number of correctly recalled letter sets. Scores are out of a possible 75.
b
Time to identify an incorrect trial in milliseconds. cTotal correct. Scores are out of a
possible 40.
Working Memory Capacity and Targeting Accuracy
We examined the relationship between working memory capacity and targeting
accuracy to confirm differences in working memory demand for information and decision
automation. Targeting accuracy was the mean proportion of selecting correct pairs of
friendly and enemy units. High accuracy can imply complacent behavior because
individuals lacking in working memory capacity should have greater dependence on the
automated aid when experiencing greater demand. Information automation was expected
to demand more working memory because it provided less automated support in the task.
Thus, we hypothesized that working memory capacity scores would predict participants’
targeting accuracy more for information automation than decision automation. We also
anticipated that older adults’ lower working memory capacity scores would predict
targeting accuracy more than younger adults’ higher working memory capacity scores.
Simple linear regressions were calculated to regress targeting accuracy on working
memory capacity scores. In the following regression analyses, we separated by age group
and DOA to assess both hypotheses.
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For older adults using information automation, working memory capacity scores
accounted for 18.2% of the variance in targeting accuracy (F (1, 41) = 8.88, p < .01,
R2adjusted = .16). Working memory capacity scores positively correlated with targeting
accuracy (β = .004, t(41) = 2.98, p < .01) (Figure 2). For older adults using decision
automation, working memory capacity scores accounted for 11.3% of the variance in
targeting accuracy (F (1, 41) = 5.10, p < .05, R2adjusted = .09). Working memory capacity
scores again positively correlated with targeting accuracy (β = .004, t(41) = 2.26, p < .05)
(Figure 3). The results confirmed that information automation had relatively higher
working memory demand than decision automation for older adults.
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Figure 2. Older adult working memory capacity scores predicting targeting accuracy for
information automation.
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We regressed targeting accuracy on younger adults’ working memory capacity
scores similar to the older adult analyses discussed above. As expected, younger adults’
high working memory capacity scores did not significantly predict targeting accuracy for
information or decision automation. Thus, older adults experienced greater working
memory demand in the targeting task than younger adults. Unlike older adults, younger
adults experienced equivalent working memory demand for information and decision
automation. The result indicates that younger adults were not as affected by the
differences in working memory demand for information and decision automation because
of their high working memory capacity.
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Figure 3. Older adult working memory capacity scores predicting targeting accuracy for
decision automation.
Complacency Potential
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We analyzed a measure of complacency potential to confirm that older adults
exhibited greater complacency potential compared to younger adults. An independent
samples t-test compared age groups on complacency potential. There was a violation of
homogeneity of variance as assessed by Levene's Test for Equality of Variances. Thus,
we made adjustments to the degrees of freedom using the Welch-Satterthwaite method.
As expected, older adults (M = 46.83, SD = 3.66) had higher complacency potential than
younger adults (M = 43.05, SD = 5.34), t(68.55) = -3.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. The result
indicates the influence of age on attitudes towards automation.
Targeting Task
Task Time
Next, we hypothesized a main effect of DOA with faster task times with decision
automation (a higher DOA with more of the task automated) than information automation
(a lower DOA). We expected a main effect of age group, such that younger adults would
make faster selections than older adults. Average task time was the number of seconds it
took participants to match a friendly and enemy unit. A 2 (age group: young, old) x 2
(DOA: information, decision) x 2 (trial reliability: reliable, unreliable) repeated measures
ANOVA for targeting task time revealed significant main effects for DOA (F (1, 80) =
31.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .28) and age (F (1, 80) = 227.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .74) (see Table 3).
There were no significant main effects for trial reliability or any significant 2 or 3-way
interactions. Participants were faster with decision automation (M = 7.31, SD = 2.93) than
information automation (M = 8.32, SD = 2.90). Younger adults were faster (M = 5.34, SD
= .95) than older adults (M = 10.17, SD = 2.16). The results confirm the expected main
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effects for age group and DOA. The lack of an interaction between age, DOA, and trial
reliability indicates that both age groups might have similar dependence on automation.
Table 3
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Task Time
Younger Adults
SD
Trial Reliability and DOA
M
Unreliable Information Automation
5.69
0.86
Reliable Information Automation
5.79
0.77
Unreliable Decision Automation
4.92
1.00
Reliable Decision Automation
4.91
0.93

Older Adults
M
SD
10.67
2.06
10.78
1.93
9.65
2.50
9.58
2.24

Task Accuracy
In addition to targeting task time, the next measure used to infer complacent
behavior was targeting task accuracy. We expected a significant interaction between age,
DOA, and trial reliability. Additionally, we hypothesized that participants would be more
accurate with decision automation than information automation and younger adults would
have greater accuracy than older adults. A 2 (age group: young, old) x 2 (DOA:
information, decision) x 2 (trial reliability: reliable, unreliable) repeated measures
ANOVA for targeting task accuracy revealed significant main effects for DOA (F (1, 80)
= 44.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .36) and trial reliability (F (1, 80) = 47.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .37)
(Table 4). Participants were more accurate with decision automation (M = .69, SD = .16)
than information automation (M = .58, SD = .15). Participants were more accurate with
reliable (M = .69, SD = .19) than unreliable automation (M = .42, SD = .26). The results
confirm the expected main effects for trial reliability and DOA. There were no significant
main effects for age or any significant 3-way interactions. However, there was one
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significant 2-way interaction between DOA and trial reliability, F (1, 80) = 8.82, p < .01,
ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 4).
Table 4
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Task Accuracy
Younger Adults
SD
Trial Reliability and DOA
M
Unreliable Information Automation
0.40
0.26
Reliable Information Automation
0.63
0.18
Unreliable Decision Automation
0.44
0.32
Reliable Decision Automation
0.80
0.20

Older Adults
M
SD
0.39
0.27
0.62
0.20
0.44
0.31
0.73
0.21

The source of the significant 2-way interaction between DOA and trial reliability
was a greater difference in accuracy between DOA for reliable automation, F (1, 80) =
83.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .51, than for unreliable automation, F (1, 80) = 3.46, p = .07, ηp2 =
.04 (Figure 2). We also examined accuracy for reliability simple main effects, that is, the
differences between reliable and unreliable trials for each DOA separately. There was a
significant difference in accuracy between reliable and unreliable trials for information
automation, F (1, 80) = 34.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, and for decision automation, F (1, 80)
= 48.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .38.
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1
Targeting Accuracy (proportion)

0.9
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Reliable Trials
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0.2
0.1
0
Information Automation

Decision Automation

Degree of Automation

Figure 4. Targeting accuracy shown by trial reliability type for information and decision
automation. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
Working Memory Capacity and Complacency
A hierarchical linear regression was conducted to predict objective and subjective
measures of complacency based on working memory capacity scores and age. In the
hierarchical regression, predictors were entered in steps. Hierarchical regressions allowed
us to examine unique variance by statistically controlling for the influence of variables
entered in previous steps. Our hypothesis was that working memory capacity scores
would predict complacency after we controlled for the influence of age. Since
complacency is the assumption that automation is reliable, participants will depend on the
automated aid when it is accurate or faulty. Thus, we can infer complacent behavior from
targeting accuracy for reliable trials (i.e., high accuracy when dependent) and unreliable
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trials (i.e., low accuracy when dependent). Additionally, we can observe complacent
behavior through targeting time because faster selections with unreliable trials compared
to reliable trials suggest less time spent verifying faulty automation. We created an
‘objective’ measure of complacency by subtracting unreliable trial performance from
reliable trial performance (i.e., separate for time and accuracy). Higher difference scores
indicated greater dependence on automation. The difference scores for time and accuracy
were standardized, so that both variables were on the same scale. Then, we added the
scores together to create a combined complacency value. Participants in our study were
more complacent with a higher DOA, so we investigated the role of working memory on
complacency only for decision automation.
Separate regressions were conducted for decision automation complacency and
complacency potential (Table 5 & 6). Each step in the model tested the extent to which a
variable accounted for significant variance in subjective and objective measures of
complacency after another variable was controlled for. Total variance accounted for is
shown at R2 and the new variance accounted for after adding another variable is indicated
by ∆R2. In Step 1, age was entered as a control variable. Age accounted for only 0.9% of
the variance in complacency for decision automation. However, age predicted
complacency potential by accounting for 15.5% of the variance in the subjective ratings.
This finding was expected because of the significant age difference in complacency
potential between younger and older adults.
Table 5
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Decision
Automation Complacency
Variable
R2
∆R2
β
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∆F

p

Step 1

.009

.009

Age

0.75

.39

-.096

Step 2

.022
.013
1.06
.41
Age
-.036
Working Memory Capacity
.130
Note. Bolded items indicate significant increments/predictors. The R2 indicates the total
variance accounted for with the inclusion of each step. The ∆R2 indicates the change in
total R2 attributable to the inclusion of a step. The ∆F statistic indicates the change in F
associated with the inclusion of each block of variables.
After we controlled for age, working memory capacity scores failed to account for
significant unique variance in subjective or objective measures of complacency. The
overall model for complacency potential was significant after including working
memory, but the amount of unique variance was low (2.2%). Working memory was
expected to predict complacency for decision automation, but our analyses suggest that
participants had limited complacency in the automated task.
Table 6
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting
Complacency Potential
Variable
R2
∆R2
β
∆F
p
Step 1
.155
.155
14.64
.00
Age
.393
Step 2
.177
.022
2.14
.00
Age
.472
Working Memory Capacity
.169
Note. Bolded items indicate significant increments/predictors. The R2 indicates the total
variance accounted for with the inclusion of each step. The ∆R2 indicates the change in
total R2 attributable to the inclusion of a step. The ∆F statistic indicates the change in F
associated with the inclusion of each block of variables.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of age and DOA on
complacent behavior in an automated task. Based on previous research, we hypothesized
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that older adults would depend more on automation with greater working memory
demand than younger adults. Several interesting findings emerged from this study, many
of which were contrary to our hypotheses:
1) Older adults experienced greater working memory demand for information
automation. Younger adults experienced the same working memory
demand for information and decision automation.
2) Task accuracy was the same for younger and older adults at each DOA.
However, younger adults completed the targeting task quicker than older
adults.
3) Participants’ working memory capacity scores did not predict greater
dependence on automation.
These findings are now discussed in more detail along with theoretical proposition for
why these results may have occurred.
The two DOAs used in the study did vary in working memory demand, but only
for older adults. We confirmed that decision automation required fewer cognitive
resources than information automation. This finding supports the suggestion that higher
forms of automation reduce cognitive demand (Onnasch et al., 2014). However, younger
adults did not experience differences in working memory demand between information
and decision automation. Researchers previously found that younger adults’ working
memory capacity does not predict performance in automated tasks (Saqer, de Visser,
Emfield, Shaw, & Parasuraman, 2011). Since younger adults have greater working
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memory capacity, they have more resources to deal with varying levels of working
memory demand.
In the automated targeting task, participants were expected to make more accurate
and faster responses when using decision automation compared to information
automation. This hypothesis was supported for targeting accuracy and response times.
Our findings conform to a previous meta-analysis that showed performance increases for
higher DOAs (Onnasch et al., 2014). Additionally, we hypothesized that younger adults
would outperform older adults on targeting task accuracy and time. There were age
differences in targeting time; older adults were significantly slower at making selections
compared to younger adults. These differences in completion time were due to agerelated changes in perceptual speed (Salthouse, 1985) and the additional time given to
older adults to attempt each trial (i.e., 10 more seconds than younger adults).
The anticipated age difference in targeting accuracy was not found in the study.
Participants of either age group did not significantly differ in selecting the correct choice
when presented with information or decision automation. One potential explanation of
this finding was that the lack of age differences in targeting accuracy could have been
due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff. Each age group experienced a different amount of time
pressure, which can influence decision-making (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Since older adults had 10 additional seconds for each trial than younger adults, they could
have prioritized accuracy over speed to identify the correct answer for each trial.
However, we found that there were no significant positive relationships between task
accuracy and time for older adults except with unreliable decision automation. Even
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though older adults’ accuracy and response times were positively related for those
unreliable trials (r = .37), we observed the same positive relationship among younger
adults as well (r = .26). Additionally, older adults on average completed all trials of the
targeting task approximately 10 or more seconds before the time limit (i.e., 20 seconds).
Older adults did not use all of the time allotted and failed to outperform younger adults
(Tables 3 & 4). Based on our observed findings, it appears that a speed-accuracy tradeoff
is not a suitable explanation.
The study tested the hypothesis that older adults would have greater complacency
than younger adults for information automation and no differences in complacency for
decision automation. Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa (2005) suggested that age differences in
working memory capacity increased automation dependence for older adults. Our results
suggest that there were no age-related differences in complacency when the task varied in
working memory demand. Overall, working memory capacity failed to predict
complacency in the automated task. Similar to age differences in working memory, older
adults had significantly higher complacency potential than younger adults. However,
these attitudes did not translate to differences in automation dependence. Interestingly,
Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa (2005) found no age differences in complacency potential
using the CPRS, but detected greater automation dependence among older adults. Even
though the CPRS has high internal consistency and test-retest reliability, researchers only
found a modest relationship (r = .42) between performance measures of complacency and
individual differences in complacency potential (Singh et al., 1993a; Singh et al., 1993b).
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Due to the mixed results observed across studies, the CPRS may not be a consistent
indicator of actual complacency.
Our findings do not disprove the role of working memory in automation-induced
complacency. Researchers have attributed lower working memory capacity to greater
automation dependence (Ho, Kiff, Plocher, & Haigh, 2005; Ho, Wheatley, & Scialfa,
2005; Rovira, Pak, & McLaughlin, accepted with revisions). However, the simulation
tasks used in our research failed to replicate the age-related differences in automation use
found within the literature (Mouloua, Smither, Vincenzi, & Smith, 2002; Parasuraman &
Manzey, 2010).
One major limitation of our study was the low task load (i.e., difficulty) in the
targeting task, which kept constant the number of units within the grid. When researchers
manipulated task load, younger and older adults differed in automation use (McBride,
Rodgers, & Fisk, 2011). Even though the UAV simulation divided attention across two
different tasks, participants could perform the targeting task without the automation. The
grid was present at all times, so that participants could verify the automation. Older adults
were as complacent as younger adults with automation that had greater working memory
demand. Research that used the same UAV simulation tasks found higher complacency
as task load increased, especially for participants with lower working memory (Rovira,
Pak, & McLaughlin, accepted with revisions). This result supports the suggestion that
complacency is only expected to appear under conditions of high task load (Parasuraman,
Molloy, & Singh, 1993). Since we did not manipulate the task load of the targeting task,
we failed to observe any age-related differences in automation use. Future research
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should examine the relationship between age and task load on human-automation
interaction.
Participants engaged with only two forms of automation multiple times in our
repeated measures design. Since performance was averaged across several blocks of
trials, younger and older adults may have adjusted their behavior to the automation
throughout the study. Recent aging literature found that older adults take longer to alter
their dependence on automation, but these age-related differences in dependence are
eventually mitigated (Sanchez, Rogers, Fisk, & Rovira, 2014). In our study, we had
participants complete all trials using one DOA before presenting the other DOA. Future
research may consider alternating between different forms of automation to vary working
memory demand throughout the entire task.
Another possible limitation of our study is that participants did not perform the
tasks without the use of automation (i.e., manual control). Researchers have used manual
control as a way to investigate the benefits and costs of automation (Onnasch et al.,
2014). The lack of automation support can demonstrate differences in task performance
between automation conditions. Manual control represents a baseline to compare against
low and high DOAs. Future research should include a manual control condition to
examine age differences in automation use.
For our study, we attempted to create an objective measure of complacency that
could explain the relationship between working memory and automation dependence. In
the automation literature, researchers observed complacency as poor monitoring ability
(i.e., accuracy) and the speed of responses to automation failures (i.e., response time)
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(Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Thus, we combined response time and accuracy into a
single measure. However, we failed to observe large differences between reliable and
unreliable trial performance in our sample. In particular, targeting accuracy for unreliable
trials did not decrease when participants used decision automation. Researchers observed
a consistent connection between higher DOAs and poorer performance with unreliable
automation (Onnasch et al., 2014). In our study, participants’ improved accuracy for both
reliable and unreliable trials with decision automation suggests little evidence for
complacent behavior. Therefore, the lack of complacency in the automated task explains
the small amount of explained variability from working memory capacity scores. Future
research on automation dependence should assess and determine the conditions that
increase the amount of measurable complacent behavior.
The simulation tasks used in the study were not entirely representative of real life
situations. Similar to military scenarios, the tasks were designed to have time pressure
that forced participants to make quick decisions. However, there were no penalties for
making mistakes in the targeting or communication tasks. The penalty for taking a long
time to respond or answering incorrectly could be deadly in actual military situations.
Higher costs or values associated with making an error can reduce dependence on
automation (Ezer, Fisk, & Rogers, 2008). Since the simulation tasks did not penalize
participants for mistakes, younger and older adults were more complacent with our
automation than other real world systems.
Our study differed from most automation studies in that we had participants
perform a task where automation was always present. We decided to use automation that
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was visible at all times because we thought it would allow us to judge the effects of
varying amounts of computerized support on complacency. In comparison, alarm-based
systems are primarily high forms of automation (i.e., display a single automation
recommendation). Also, alarm-based studies compare performance when the automation
is present or not (i.e., reliance and compliance). The automation in our study allowed us
to examine user dependence on reliable and unreliable systems that were always present.
Conclusions
The results of the study show that younger and older adults did not significantly
differ in complacent behavior across two separate DOAs. Working memory capacity was
not found to predict complacency even after controlling for differences in age. Thus,
individual differences in working memory capacity did not affect dependence on
automation when the aid varied in working memory demand. Low task load in the UAV
simulation may have reduced age-related differences in complacent behavior. Further
research is needed to examine the age-related effects of complacency for automation that
varies in cognitive demand.
Practical Implications
Examining the factors that affect automation dependence with novel interfaces
can provide information about existing theories on automation use. Automation that is
imperfect can influence how operators perform under varying amounts of computerized
assistance. Our results indicated that younger and older adults did not differ in their
dependence on automated aids that varied in working memory demand. However, both
age groups were more complacent with greater automated support that had less working
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memory demand. Many automated devices and interfaces are designed to alleviate
cognitive demand by providing fewer decision-making options for users (e.g., GPS,
ATM). Since complacent behavior is more likely to occur with these types of technology,
systems that utilize both higher and lower DOAs (i.e., adaptive automation; Corso &
Moloney, 1996) could limit overdependence. Automation could occasionally provide less
support to keep the user engaged in the task and cognizant of possible system failures.
Therefore, our results suggest that designers should create interfaces that vary in working
memory demand. Future research should examine the effect of adaptive automation that
switches between differing levels of working memory demand on complacent behavior.
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Appendix A
Examples of DOA and Reliability Manipulations
Reliable Information Automation Trial Example:

Unreliable Information Automation Trial Example:
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Reliable Decision Automation Trial Example:

Unreliable Decision Automation Trial Example:
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Appendix B
Automated Operation Span Task (Adapted from Unsworth et al., 2005)
Phase 1: Directions for Letter Memorization Practice Phase
•

In this experiment, you will try to memorize letters you see on the screen while
you also solve simple math problems.

•

You will begin by practicing the letter part of the experiment.

•

For the practice set, letters will appear on the screen one at a time. Try to
remember each letter in the order presented.

•

After 2-3 letters have been shown, you will see a screen listing 12 possible letters.

•

Your job is to select each letter in the order presented. To do this, use the mouse
to select each letter. The letters you select will appear at the top of the screen.

•

When you have selected all of the letters, and they are in the correct order, hit the
DONE box at the bottom right of the screen.

•

If you make a mistake, hit the CLEAR button to start over.

•

If you forget one of the letters, click the ? (question mark) button to mark the spot
for the missing letter.

•

Remember, it is very important to get the letters in the same order as you see
them. If you forget one, use the ? button to mark the position.

•

Do you have any questions so far? When you’re ready, click the button below to
start the letter practice.

Phase 2: Directions for Mental Math Practice Phase
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•

Now you will practice doing the math part of the experiment. A math problem
will appear on the screen like this: (2 * 1) + 1 = ?

•

As soon as you see the math problem, you should compute the correct answer. In
the above problem, the answer 3 is correct.

•

When you know the correct answer, you will click the OK button with your
mouse.

•

You will see a number displayed on the next screen, along with a button marked
TRUE and a button marked FALSE.

•

If the number on the screen is the correct answer to the math problem, click on the
TRUE box with the mouse. If the number is not the correct answer, click on the
FALSE box. For example, if you see the problem: (2 * 2) + 1 = ? and the number
on the following screen is 5 click the TRUE box, because the answer is correct. If
you see the problem: (2 * 2) + 1 = ? and the number on the next screen is 6 click
the FALSE box, because the correct answer is 5, not 6. After you click on one of
the boxes, the computer will tell you if you made the right choice,

•

It is VERY important that you get the math problems correct.

•

It is also important that you try and solve the problem as quickly as you can.

•

Do you have any questions? When you’re ready, click the mouse to try some
practice problems.

Phase 3: Directions for Combined Letter Memorization and Mental Math Phase
•

Now you will practice doing both parts of the experiment at the same time. In the
next practice set, you will be given one of the math problems.
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•

Once you make your decision about the math problem, a letter will appear on the
screen. Try and remember the letter.

•

In the previous section where you only solved math problems, the computer
computed your average time to solve the problems.

•

If you take longer than your average time, the computer will automatically move
you onto the next letter part, thus skipping the True or False part and will count
that problem as a math error.

•

Therefore, it is VERY important to solve the problems as quickly and as
accurately as possible.

•

After the letter goes away, another math problem will appear, and then another
letter.

•

At the end of each set of letters and math problems, a recall screen will appear.
Use the mouse to select the letters you just saw.

•

Try your best to get the letters in the correct order. It is important to work
QUICKLY and ACCURATELY on the math. Make sure you know the answer to
the math problem before clicking to the next screen.

•

You will not be told if your answer to the math problem is correct. After the recall
screen, you will be given feedback about your performance regarding both the
number of letters recalled and the percent correct on the math problems.

•

During the feedback, you will also see your percent correct for the math problems
for the entire experiment.

•

It is VERY important for you to keep this at least at 85%.
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•

For our purposes, we can only use data where the participant was at least 85%
accurate on the math.

•

Therefore, you must perform at least at 85% on the math problems WHILE doing
your best to recall as many letters as possible.
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Appendix C
Subjective Trust in the Automated Aid (Adapted from Lee & Moray, 1992)
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Appendix D
General Rating of Trust in Automation (Adapted from Jian et al., 2000)
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Appendix E
Complacency Potential Rating Scale (Adapted from Singh, Molloy, & Parasuraman,
1993a)
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